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Abstract: This article argues that a commitment to individual freedom plays a crucial
role in William Godwin’s utilitarian political theory. In his Enquiry Concerning Politi-
cal Justice, Godwin argues that morality is grounded not in rights but rather in duties
and that each individual has a constant obligation to act in the way most conducive to
the general good. Yet, despite this apparently strict act-utilitarianism, he does defend
one key individual entitlement: the right to a sphere of discretion in which agents can
exercise their own private judgment, a right that directly informs Godwin’s critique of
various social and political institutions. I argue that though his defence of individual
freedom is an ultimately utilitarian one, its value is not contingent on consequentialist
calculations.
I
The belief that utilitarianism is incapable of accommodating individual lib-
erty is widely shared by political philosophers. It is frequently alleged that
Jeremy Bentham’s version entails the inevitable sacrifice of individual free-
dom at the altar of general happiness because of its agent-relativity.3 At the
same time, John Stuart Mill’s somewhat perfectionist alternative is often
regarded as one that leaves no room for meaningful freedom, since it appears
openly to regard some sorts of human behaviour as superior to others.4 My
aim is to outline another, often overlooked (and significantly different) utili-
tarian defence of individual freedom: that advanced by eighteenth-century
British ‘radical’ philosopher William Godwin in his Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice.5
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1 I am very grateful to the other conference participants for their searching questions
and to the editors for their encouragement. I am also indebted to Benjamin Thompson
and Corinna Wagner for criticisms of an earlier draft.
2 Dept. of Politics, Amory Building, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon EX4 4RJ.
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3 For a recent denial of this well-worn charge, see Frederick Rosen, Classical Utili-
tarianism from Hume to Mill (London, 2003).
4 It is often claimed that Mill’s impassioned defence of freedom and individuality in
On Liberty is glaringly inconsistent with his identification of ‘higher’ pleasures in Utili-
tarianism. See, for example, C.L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford, 1980).
5 Political Justice was first published in 1793, but then republished with significant
revisions in 1795 and again with further tinkering in 1797. My analysis focuses on the
third edition, which appears to represent the most coherent and systematic expression of
a utilitarian political theory. Whether or not Godwin actually counts as a utilitarian
thinker is a matter of some dispute. Older historical accounts of utilitarianism do include
him as a prominent figure in its development — for example Leslie Stephen, The English
Utilitarians (London, 1900), Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism
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In the preface to Political Justice, Godwin describes his arguments as ‘ill
suited to answering a temporary purpose’, aimed instead at uncovering ‘im-
mutable truth’.6 Despite this claim, he did later admit that his text was, in
many respects, ‘a child of the French Revolution’.7 Thus, although Political
Justice is the culmination of a complex intellectual heritage — indebted to the
philosophes, Epicureanism and Rational Dissent — it is also a contribution to
the British ‘debate’ on the French Revolution and a response to the tumultu-
ous political circumstances of the 1790s.8 Godwin and his contemporaries
bore witness to a raft of draconian legislation passed by William Pitt’s Tory
government that explicitly aimed to vanquish an alleged threat to national
security posed by an enemy within: in this case that of ‘republicans’ and ‘lev-
ellers’.9 The repressive measures included the intermittent suspension of
habeas corpus, the curtailment of public meetings, the censorship of the utter-
ance of ‘seditious words’ in either political pamphlets or private
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(London, 1952) and John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (London, 1958). Recent
scholarship has, however, been more divided on the matter. Among those who regard
Godwin as a utilitarian are D.H. Monro, Godwin’s Moral Philosophy: An Interpretation
of William Godwin (London, 1953); John P. Clark, The Philosophical Anarchism of Wil-
liam Godwin (Princeton, 1977); Don Locke, A Fantasy of Reason: The Life and Thought
of William Godwin (London, 1980); Peter H. Marshall, William Godwin (London, 1984).
Those who contest this interpretation include F.E.L. Priestly, in the introduction to his
edition of the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Toronto, 1946); William Stafford,
‘Dissenting Religion Translated into Politics: Godwin’s Political Justice’, History of
Political Thought, I (2) (1980), pp. 279–99; and Mark Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice
(Ithaca, 1986), esp. ch. 4. Most of the arguments against a utilitarian interpretation privi-
lege the role of Godwin’s early intellectual immersion in the tradition of Rational Dis-
sent. Philp in particular stresses this and contends that it is only through placing Godwin
in this context that we can make sense of Godwin’s commitment to a ‘right of private
judgement’. Philp is willing to concede that the dominant influence of the Dissenting tra-
dition in the first edition gives way to a thoroughgoing rule-utilitarianism by the second
(pp. 157–9), though he does maintain that Godwin ‘can hardly be said to offer this
sophisticated form of utilitarianism as a sophisticated form of utilitarianism’ (p. 159).
6 William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals
and Happiness (1798), ed. F.E.L. Priestly (Toronto, 1946), Vol. I, p. xvii.
7 This description was added reflectively in Godwin’s ‘Thoughts Occasioned by Dr.
Parr’s Spital Sermon’ (1801), in Uncollected Writings by William Godwin (1785–1822),
ed. J.W. Marken and B.R. Pollin (Gainsville, FL, 1968). In the preface to the first edition
of Political Justice, he reveals that ‘of the desirableness of a government in the utmost
degree simple he was not persuaded but in consequence of ideas suggested by the French
Revolution’, Vol. I, p. x.
8 Mark Philp’s Godwin’s Political Justice provides a richly detailed analysis of the
different philosophical contexts within which Political Justice can be understood. See
chs. 1–3 for a discussion of the main influences on Godwin’s intellectual development,
which argues that Rational Dissent was the most significant and enduring.
9 The most significant government-sponsored loyalist organization was the John
Reeves ‘Association for the Protection of Liberty and Property against Republicans and
Levellers’.
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conversations and the recruitment of a network of government spies, which
duly peopled coffee houses and taverns in search of the so-called ‘friends of
liberty’.10 Such developments, which Godwin described as ‘alarming
encroachments upon our liberty’, inspired the writing (and revision) of Politi-
cal Justice for the ‘panic struck’ British public of the 1790s.11
II
Given such political circumstances, it is perhaps not particularly surprising
that a defence of individual freedom is at the heart of Godwin’s political theory,
albeit in a quite different way from those of his immediate contemporaries. In
1790s Britain there was a spectacular revival of natural rights political argu-
ments, which began with the veteran Dissenter Richard Price’s infamous
‘Discourse on the Love of Our Country’ (1789), a tubthumping sermon that,
though ostensibly intended to celebrate the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688,
was evidently inspired by the French Revolution. The aspect of Price’s ser-
mon that loomed largest in Edmund Burke’s notoriously apoplectic response,
Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), was the assertion that 1688
had actually established three fundamental rights for the people of England:
‘the right to chuse our own governors; to cashier them for misconduct; and to
frame a government for ourselves’.12
Part of Burke’s refutation of this claim rested simply on an interpretation of
the events themselves which, he argued, failed to vindicate Price’s assertion
of rights.13 However, another key aspect of Burke’s refutation of Price’s argu-
ment was his suggestion that the sovereignty of British governments was
something bequeathed from past political tradition; something inherited. In
one particularly memorable passage, Burke declares that
. . . from the Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the
uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an
entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted
to our posterity . . . We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and
10 For a particularly vivid and illuminating account of the context surrounding gov-
ernment legislation in the 1790s and the responses to it, see John Barrell, Imagining the
King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Treason, 1793–1796 (Oxford, 2000).
11 Godwin, Political Justice, p. xii.
12 Richard Price, ‘A Discourse on the Love of Our Country’, in Political Writings of
the 1790s: Volume 3, ed. G. Claeys (London, 1995), p. 16.
13 Burke’s pronouncement was rather that ‘[s]o far is it from being true, that we
acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings, that if we had possessed it before,
the English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for them-
selves and for all their posterity for ever’. E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in
France (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 104; see also pp. 99–100.
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an house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and lib-
erties, from a long line of ancestors.14
It is not merely the fact that 1688 failed to establish inalienable individual
rights against ‘our governors’; the contention is rather that government is
something that is legitimately threaded through history in hereditary succes-
sion.15 It is this second aspect of Burke’s argument — the case for the moral
rightness of hereditary political institutions — that Thomas Paine then attempted
to comprehensively undermine in his Rights of Man, published in 1791. When
making his case against the justification of political authority on hereditary
grounds, Paine advances a theory of sovereignty that is both limited and con-
ditional: he argues that past constitutional agreements cannot have any lasting
authority, since this would give the dead authority over the living. Instead,
‘every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the
ages and generations which preceded it’.16 Therefore, even if Burke’s inter-
pretation of the meaning of the Glorious Revolution were, as a matter of fact,
a reliable one, it still has no authority over or bearing on contemporary politi-
cal issues.
Paine endorses the three rights cited by Price (as well as several others) and,
crucially, does not care whether they were actually established by a particular
historical incident or not. But he does not spend much time furnishing these
individual rights with any comprehensive or detailed justification. For Paine,
individuals have rights simply by virtue of their membership of the moral uni-
verse, which is constituted by all ‘living’ human beings. All individuals are
holders of natural rights, some of which become civil rights after the estab-
lishment of a social contract and the rest of which are retained to be held
against government and other agents.17 Rights-based moral and political argu-
ments became increasingly dominant in the political writing of British radi-
cals — such as Thomas Spence, Mary Wollstonecraft and John Thelwall —
throughout the decade.18
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14 Ibid., p. 119.
15 Burke’s defence of inheritance seems to rely on what modern philosophers refer to
as the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, the derivation of a moral ‘ought’ from a factual (and thus
non-moral) ‘is’. His response to such a charge would probably be to suggest that the very
concept of a naturalistic fallacy is a dangerous abstraction.
16 Thomas Paine, ‘Rights of Man, Part One’, in The Complete Works of Thomas
Paine, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York, 1969), Vol. I, p. 251.
17 Ibid., pp. 275–7.
18 This is not to say that all natural rights arguments in the 1790s were Painite. For
discussions of the prominence of rights theories and of the various languages of political
argument in the 1790s, see Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘John Thelwall and the Eighteenth-
Century Radical Response to Political Economy’, The Historical Journal, 34 (1991), pp.
1–20; Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘On Not Inventing the British Revolution’, in British
Radicalisms, ed. M. Festenstein and G. Burgess (Cambridge, 2005); G. Claeys, ‘The
French Revolution Debate and British Political Thought’, History of Political Thought,
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For Paine, it is not only individuals who are holders of rights but also
national political communities. His subsequent reputation as a cosmopoli-
tan political thinker and ‘citizen of the world’ has often eclipsed the impor-
tant (and problematic) role that nationhood is given in the first part of
Rights of Man.19 Herein, he explicitly defines sovereignty as something
that is located in a ‘nation’, which ‘has at all times an inherent, indefeasible
right to abolish any form of government it finds inconvenient’.20 Further-
more, he asserts that it is the first three articles of the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man that encapsulates the ‘basis of liberty’.21 The third
article importantly stipulates that it is ‘the nation’ that ‘is the source of all
sovereignty’ and that no ‘individual or . . . body of men [are] entitled to any
authority which is not expressly derived from it’.22 This idea of nation-
hood in which Paine invests so heavily is also invoked in his critique of
Burke.
In fact, it is rarely remarked upon that Paine upbraids Burke not only for
the content of his attack on the French Revolution, but also for actually
having launched the attack in the first place. Burke is not only mistaken in
his defence of the rights of the dead over the living, he is mistaken in think-
ing it his business to interfere with the rights of a nation. By placing such
importance on the sovereignty embodied by (and rights contained) in a
‘nation’, Paine is able to reject Burke’s specific arguments concerning
events in France. In other words, as well as dismissing the substance of
Reflections as ‘an outrageous abuse on . . . the principles of Liberty’,23 he
also rejects the notion that Burke’s opinion could ever be of any relevance
to the French.24
XI (1990), pp. 59–80; G. Claeys, ‘The Origins of the Rights of Labor: Republicanism,
Commerce, and the Construction of Modern Social Theory in Britain, 1796–1805’, Jour-
nal of Modern History, 66 (1994), pp. 249–90; Mark Philp, ‘The Fragmented Ideology of
Reform’, in The French Revolution and British Popular Politics, ed. M. Philp (Cam-
bridge, 1991); M. Philp, ‘English Republicanism in the 1790s’, The Journal of Political
Philosophy (1999), pp. 235–62. For a discussion of the particularly complex case of
Mary Wollstonecraft, see Lena Halldenius, ‘The Primacy of Right: On the Triad of Lib-
erty, Equality, and Virtue in Wollstonecraft’s Political Thought’, British Journal for the
History of Philosophy (forthcoming).
19 For a discussion that stresses his cosmopolitan credentials, see Ian Dyck, ‘Local
Attachments, National Identities and World Citizenship in the Thought of Thomas
Paine’, History Workshop Journal, 35 (1993), pp. 117–35.
20 Paine, ‘Rights of Man’, p. 341.
21 Ibid., p. 316.
22 Ibid., p. 314.
23 Ibid., p. 245.
24 ‘Neither the people of France nor the national assembly were troubling themselves
about the affairs of England or the English parliament; and why Mr. Burke should com-
mence an unprovoked attack upon them, both in parliament and in public, is a conduct
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III
The political theory outlined by Paine in Rights of Man in many ways typifies
the sort of rights-based arguments that dominated British radicalism in the
1790s and Godwin’s political thought stands out as a rejection of such argu-
ments. He denies outright any attempt to situate rights in the opinion or will of
a nation on the grounds that such an argument is nothing more than moral rel-
ativism — ‘nation’ is, he claims, ‘an arbitrary term’ of no ethical signifi-
cance.25 It follows from this that the ‘voice of the people’ can never justify a
particular government because popularity provides no guarantee against ‘ab-
surdity and injustice’: ‘universal consent’ does not have the power to ‘convert
wrong into right’.26
Godwin suggests that Paine has been ‘misled by the vulgar phraseology’27
circulating on the issue of individual liberty. This ‘vulgar phraseology’ is
clearly the language of natural rights, the ‘confused’ underpinnings of which
Godwin aims to ‘explode’.28 ‘Few things’ he suggests, ‘have contributed
more to undermine the energy and virtue of the human species than the suppo-
sition that we have a right . . . to do what we will with our own’.29 For Godwin,
rights are not axioms from which morality is to be derived. ‘Morality’ is rather
Nothing else but that system which teaches us to contribute upon all occa-
sions, to the extent of our power, to the well-being and happiness of every
individual and sensitive existence.30
This seems to be an unambiguous statement of act-utilitarianism, one that
would seem necessarily hostile towards inviolable individual rights.
Godwin appears particularly scornful of rights of free association and free
speech. ‘According to the usual sentiment’, he observes
Every club assembling for any civil purpose, every congregation of reli-
gionists assembling for the worship of God, has a right to establish any
666 R. LAMB
that cannot be pardoned on the score of manners, nor justified on that of policy.’ Ibid.,
p. 249.
25 Godwin, Political Justice, I, p. 258. See also ibid., p. 220 for further discussion of
this point.
26 Ibid., p. 165.
27 Ibid., p. 164. Godwin and Paine were allied politically by their enthusiasm for the
French Revolution, but were never especially close. Godwin remained a keen admirer,
citing Paine as ‘an acute and original author’ in Political Justice (p. 164). It has often
been suggested that Godwin directly assisted with the publication of Paine’s Rights of
Man in 1791, when publisher Joseph Johnson backed out of it due to its (correctly) pre-
sumed inflammatory nature. See Marshall, William Godwin, pp. 80–1. The possibility of
this has, however, been challenged by Mark Philp, ‘Godwin, Holcroft and the Rights of
Man’, Enlightenment and Dissent, I (1982), pp. 37–42.
28 Godwin, Political Justice, I, p. 158.
29 Ibid., p. 161.
30 Ibid., p. 159.
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provisions or ceremonies, no matter how ridiculous or detestable, provided
they do not interfere with the freedom of others.31
On the contrary, he contends that
If a congregation of men agree universally to cut off their right hand, to shut
their ears upon free enquiry, or to affirm two and two . . . to be sixteen, in all
these cases they are wrong, and ought unequivocally to be censured for
usurping an authority that does not belong to them.32
The demolition of individual rights in this passage appears again to have a
bluntly act-utilitarian basis. The reason that individuals are not permitted the
freedom to ‘shut their ears’ is that they have, at all times, a moral duty to
engage in critical enquiry and think for themselves. This idea of a duty of criti-
cal enquiry features prominently in Godwin’s critique of Paine’s rights-based
political arguments. As noted above, Paine argues that one entailment of the
sacredness of national sovereignty is that non-nationals have no right to opine
on internal political issues — thus Burke has no right to pass comment or criti-
cism on the activities of the French. Godwin dismisses Paine’s argument out
of hand and asserts instead that ‘the most insignificant individual ought to
hold himself free to animadvert upon the decisions of the most august assem-
bly’.33 Moreover, ‘other men are bound in justice to listen to him, in propor-
tion to the soundness of his reasons, and the strength of his remarks’ rather
than on the basis of irrelevant factors such as nationality.34 For Godwin, there-
fore, Paine is thoroughly misguided in his rebuke of Burke’s act. But it is not
merely the case that individuals like Burke simply ought to be able to animad-
vert freely, rather they ought to animadvert freely — it is an activity to which
they are bound by the demands of justice. It is for this same reason that no
individual has a right to ‘shut their ears upon free enquiry’.
As Godwin is keenly aware, in order for an agent to fulfil a moral duty, that
person must logically have a ‘right’ to do so. In order to accommodate such
logic, he draws a distinction between ‘active’ rights and ‘passive’ rights. The
difference between these two rights is not explicable in terms of degree: it is
not, for instance, the Hohfeldian distinction between a ‘claim right’ and a
‘privilege’ or ‘liberty’: both active and passive rights are claim rights, since
both generate a duty of forbearance in others.35 The difference is instead a
matter of justification. Active rights are claimed to be self-justifiable individ-
ual freedoms and as such are ‘superseded and rendered null by the superior
31 Ibid., p. 164.
32 Ibid., p. 166.
33 Ibid., p. 165.
34 Ibid., pp. 165–6.
35 In his ‘Summary of Principles, Godwin defines a ‘right’ as ‘the claim of the indi-
vidual to his share of the benefit arising from his neighbours’ discharge of their several
duties’ a claim that ‘is either to the exertion or the forbearance of his neighbours’. Ibid.,
p. xxv.
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claims of justice’.36 Such rights ignore the fact that ‘every one of our actions
fall within the province of morals’ and thus that ‘we have no rights in relation
to the selecting of them’.37 For Godwin, the nature of justice is such that ‘we
have in reality nothing that is strictly speaking our own’.38 He is infamously
ruthless in the application of this insight and demands that individuals devote
their ‘talents’ ‘understanding’, ‘strength’ and ‘time’ for ‘the production of the
greatest quantity of general good’.39 As he holds this utilitarian attitude
towards morality and regards the idea of active rights to be ‘the offspring of
ignorance and imbecility’,40 it is unsurprising that he flatly dismisses the
notion that individuals can be said to hold a right to ‘personal liberty’.41 Such
a right would seem to permit individuals to engage in actions of their own
choosing, which would be likely to conflict with the demands of general util-
ity: ‘there cannot be a more absurd proposition than that which affirms the
right of doing wrong’.42 So, individuals have no active rights.
Unlike what Godwin regards as self-justifiable active rights, passive rights
have a utilitarian justification: they are rights that derive their normative force
from prior obligations. Godwin endorses two different passive rights. The
first is an entitlement to a ‘sphere of discretion’, within which each individual
‘has a right to expect shall not be infringed by his neighbours’.43 Within such a
sphere, ‘it is necessary that every man should stand by himself, and rest upon
his own understanding’ when it comes to deciding on a particular course of
action: individuals must always be ensured this certain area of liberty.44 The
reason for this entitlement is that individuals have a fundamental ‘right to pri-
vate judgement’. The precise scope of the discretion demanded by this right is
somewhat ambiguously defined. Notably, an individual’s right to discretion
fails to generate a corresponding duty in others to leave them completely
alone whilst they utilize their private judgment. Rather, our ‘neighbours’ are
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36 Ibid., p. 166.
37 Ibid., p. 159. Godwin’s presentation of the case against rights changes between the
editions of Political Justice. He initially describes rights as ‘discretionary powers’,
which individuals could be said to have over minor matters: ‘in things of total indiffer-
ence, as whether I sit on the right or on the left side of my fire, or dine on beef today or
tomorrow. Even these rights are much fewer than we are apt to imagine, since before they
can be completely established, it must be proved that my choice on one side or the other
can in no possible way contribute to the benefit or injury of myself or of any other person
in the world’. ‘Omitted Chapters’, in Political Justice, ed. Priestly, Vol. III, p. 256.
38 Ibid., I, p. 162. ‘There is no situation in which we can be placed, no alternative that
can be presented to our choice, respecting which duty is silent’ (ibid., II, p. 332).
39 Ibid., I, p. 135.
40 Ibid., p. 161.
41 Ibid., p. 167.
42 Ibid., p. 165.
43 Ibid., p. 167.
44 Ibid., p. 168.
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actually duty bound to advise and even admonish us, with the express aim of
influencing our actions through rational discussion. Each neighbour must
‘employ every means in his power for the amendment of our errors’, using if
necessary ‘the most unreserved animadversion upon our propensities and
conduct’ as it is ‘absurd’ to believe there are certain issues that are solely of
interest to one individual.45 Yet at the same time Godwin insists that ‘there is
scarcely any tyranny more gross than that of the man who should perpetually
intrude upon us his crude and half-witted advices’, that is, a man who would
think it his duty ‘to repeat and press it upon us without end’.46 No individual
should ‘expect to dictate to me’ and each ‘should remember that I am to act by
my deliberation and not his. He may exercise a republican boldness in judg-
ing, but must not be peremptory and imperious in prescribing’.47 The line
between imperiousness and permissible admonition appears, then, to be a
very fine one, but the point is clear enough: individuals must be guaranteed a
right to complete liberty to act on the sole dictates of their private judgment
(albeit whilst listening to the advice of other agents).48
IV
Godwin spends much of Political Justice identifying those social and political
institutions that endanger this right to individual liberty and places particular
focus on the threat posed by political authority and political associations.
Godwin’s rejection of the forces of government is legendary.49 All political
authority, he argues, inevitably thwarts individual independence. One of the
45 Ibid., p. 162. That said, Godwin does suggest at one point that if an individual is
able to freely consult their own understanding, ‘it will rarely happen that the authority of
other men’s judgement in cases of general enquiry will be of great weight’ (ibid., p. 233).
46 Ibid., p. 163.
47 Ibid., p. 168. Godwin’s exercise of such a ‘republican boldness’ in his personal life
did not always run smoothly. He and his closest friend, the radical playwright Thomas
Holcroft, regularly exchanged their latest dramatic and philosophical compositions for
criticism expressed with ‘perfect sincerity’. Eventually, their criticism proved so honest,
and so harsh, that they had to suspend the frankness and agree to tone down their remarks.
The agreement did not last long, however, as Godwin could not resist approaching
Holcroft’s ‘The Lawyer’ with a ‘sledge hammer of criticism’, which prompted a lengthy
fall-out between the two. Marshall, William Godwin, pp. 234–5.
48 This account of individual freedom links to an important distinction Godwin
makes later in Political Justice between two different types of independence: ‘natural
independence’, which is to be desired and ‘moral independence’, which is to be deplored.
Moral independence requires a sphere of active rights and is thus ‘always injurious’ (II,
p. 496). Natural independence, by contrast, is clearly what individuals have in the sphere
of liberty outlined above: it is ‘freedom from all constraint, except that of reasons and
inducements presented to the understanding’ (pp. 495–6).
49 The only caveat to Godwin’s wholesale rejection of government appears at the
beginning of his discussion of punishment: ‘government, or the actions of society in its
corporate capacity, can scarcely be of any utility except so far as it is requisite for the sup-
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reasons for this is the propensity of government toward self-perpetuation.
Governments, according to Godwin, attempt to eternalize their authority and
because of this their existence is wholly inimical to human improvement and
social progress. They ‘render the future advances of mind inexpressibly
tedious and operose’ and violently contain intellectual ‘reflection’ in an ‘un-
natural’ stasis.50 The authority of government is established not only through
the monopoly of force it commands, but also through the way in which it
ensures respect from those who are its subjects. Government facilitates a
‘modification in my conduct’ akin to that ‘which might be due in the case of a
wild beast’ and combines it ‘with the modification which is due to superior
wisdom’.51 Godwin regards this unholy amalgam of externally inculcated
human motivations as a complete ‘violation of political justice’.52 His conclu-
sion is that ‘the conduct of an enlightened and virtuous man can only be con-
formable to the regulations of government so far as those regulations are
accidentally coincident with his private judgement’.53
The main ground upon which Godwin criticizes government is clearly the
influence it has over individual opinion. ‘Opinion’ is, he claims, ‘the castle, or
rather the temple of human nature; and, if it be polluted, there is no longer
anything sacred or venerable in sublunary existence.’54 It is not merely the
case that government somehow encourages individuals to have the wrong
opinions that is at issue, but rather the fact that it influences opinion at all.
Any such influence necessarily invades the sphere of discretion that individu-
als must be guaranteed and violates the right to private judgment. Once opin-
ion becomes at all influenced by ‘political superintendence’, individuals are
‘immediately involved in a slavery to which no imagination of man can set a
termination’.55 The way in which government influences opinion is not only
through its demand of respect and obedience, but also through its ‘pernicious’
practice of providing external (and thus artificial) inducements for action.
The two best examples of such inducements are the promise of reward and
the threat of punishment.56 In the case of the former, Godwin cites ‘the most
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pression of force by force; for the prevention of the hostile attack of one member of the
society, upon the person or property of another’ (ibid., p. 322).
50 Ibid., p. 231.
51 Ibid., I, pp. 231–2.
52 Ibid., p. 231.
53 Ibid., p. 237, emphasis added.
54 Ibid., II, p. 215.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., pp. 321–2. Godwin also suggests that ‘[i]f in any instance I am made the
mechanical instrument of absolute violence, in that instance I fall under a pure state of
external slavery. If on the other hand, not being under the influence of absolute compul-
sion, I am wholly prompted by something that is frequently called by that name, and act
from the hope of reward or the fear of punishment, the subjection I suffer is doubtless less
aggravated, but the effect upon my moral habits may be in a still higher degree injurious
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important influence of opinion’ as ‘the mode of rewarding public services’
through pensions and salaries.57 Institutionalized reward renders virtuous
action impossible because it alters the intentions that lie behind individual
actions and a virtuous intention is a necessary for moral agency. In the case
of punishment, individual opinion (and therefore motivation for action) is
guided only by ‘fear’.58 Godwin seems to imply that the effect of punishment
is even more insidious and pervasive than that of reward, because it acts not
only on the individual in question but actually on society as a whole: it acts
‘not only retrospectively’ on the punished person but also ‘prospectively
upon [her] contemporaries and countrymen’.59 The commonality between
reward and punishment is that the effect of both is the subversion of virtue by
‘positive institution’.
In addition to directly informing Godwin’s diagnosis of social ills, his con-
ception of liberty also underpins his critique of what might otherwise have
been the cure: political associations. He denounces them as an ‘evil’, on the
grounds that they encourage only ‘disorder’ and ‘mischief’, because they are,
by their very nature, unable to provide an adequate forum for ‘discussion’ and
‘conversation’.60 Such associations attract ‘the acrimonious, the intemperate,
and the artful’ rather than ‘the prudent, the sober and the contemplative’.61
The entire objective of political associations is to seek power and to give
‘their opinion a weight and operation which the opinion of unconnected indi-
viduals cannot have’.62 As a result of this ambition, there is unsurprisingly
more than just a potential tendency towards absolute uniformity of opinion:
indeed, it is inevitable. Each person is forced to learn the same ‘creed’, a pro-
cess that vitiates any possibility of an individual exertion of the right to pri-
vate judgment. Godwin’s conclusion is that ‘every argument’ that can be
marshalled against the forces of government ‘is equally hostile to political
associations’.63
(I, pp. 170–1). The roots of these ideas may lie in the writings of Archbishop François
Fénelon, who defended a form of ‘pure love’, one that involves no external inducements
for action. See in particular his ‘Dissertation on Pure Love’ (1720). In Political Justice,
Godwin infamously argued that if two people were trapped in a ‘burning building’ and
one was Fénelon and the other our parent, justice would demand that we rescue the Arch-
bishop. For a discussion of this argument see Lamb, ‘The Foundations of Godwinian
Impartiality’, Utilitas, Vol. 18 (2006), pp. 134–53. I am grateful to Ben Thompson for
discussions of Fénelon’s moral philosophy.
57 Godwin, Political Justice, II, pp. 305–6.
58 Ibid., pp. 329–37.
59 Ibid., I, p. 177.
60 Ibid., pp. 294–300.
61 Ibid., pp. 286–7.
62 Ibid., p. 286.
63 Ibid., p. 293. Godwin repeated this critique of political associations in ‘Consider-
ations on Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt’s Bills’, a pamphlet he wrote and published anony-
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V
So, for Godwin, individuals have a right to a private judgment which, in turn,
requires a guaranteed sphere of discretion within which they must remain free
from all interference except for the rational arguments presented to them by
others. Moreover, this right of private judgment is incompatible with a num-
ber of political and social institutions. As noted, the right to private judgment
is described as a ‘passive’ right, one that derives its moral force from a prior
obligation. But how exactly are such rights generated by obligations?
Alan Ryan observes that Godwin ‘employs the language of rights because
he is a rigorist as well as a utilitarian’ and therefore ‘I have an absolute duty
always and at all times to do what I can for the general welfare, and conversely
I have an absolute right to what I need for the purpose’.64 Because such rights
derive from prior duties, the implication is that Godwin values freedom only
so far as it is generative of utility: the moral justification of the right of private
judgment is the overarching duty we have to maximize the general good. This
is how most interpreters have approached his case for the right to private judg-
ment. John Clark claims that the value of individual freedom is ‘derived’65
from the utility principle and any individual right necessary for the exertion of
this freedom ‘stems entirely’ from its instrumental value.66 Is it then the case
that Godwin is committed to an instrumentalist utilitarian defence of freedom,
whereby the individual right is conditional on the overall good?
An instrumentalist reading clearly accounts for part of the story. There are
certainly many moments in Political Justice when Godwin seems purely
interested in the utility of individual freedom. At one point he describes it as
‘the most valuable of all human possessions’67 and elsewhere asserts that
‘promoting the best interests of mankind eminently depends upon the free-
dom of social communication’.68 ‘Civil liberty’ is, he remarks, ‘chiefly desir-
able as a means to procure and perpetuate.’69 Perhaps most significantly, he
suggests that ‘to be free is a circumstance of little value, if we could suppose
men in a state of external freedom, without the magnanimity, energy and
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mously, signed merely ‘a lover of order’, in response to the increasingly draconian legis-
lation passed by the Tory government in the mid 1790s. Herein, Godwin again defended
freedom of thought and discussion against government legislation, suggesting that ‘[n]o
state of a human being can be devised more slavish, than where he is told that he must not
expostulate; he must not answer; the master claps a padlock upon his lips and he must be
silent; he must not have an opinion of his own’. ‘Considerations’, in Uncollected Writ-
ings, ed. Marken and Pollin, p. 250.
64 Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford, 1984), p. 92.
65 Clark, The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin, p. 203.
66 Ibid., p. 144.
67 Godwin, Political Justice, II, p. 331, emphasis added.
68 Ibid., I, p. 295, emphasis added.
69 Ibid., p. 259, emphasis added.
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firmness that constitute all that is valuable in a state of freedom’.70 These sen-
timents clearly seem to reveal a standard act-utilitarian attitude to freedom.
The right to private judgment appears, then, to be a mere shadow of our moral
duty to always act in accordance with the demands of general utility.
However, though in a sense correct, this instrumentalist reading has the
potential to misrepresent the structure of Godwin’s utilitarianism and, in
doing so, mask the unique position that freedom occupies within his political
theory. Godwin does not value individual freedom contingently: its role in his
political theory is such that it is, unlike most utilitarian rights, immune to
changes in facts or circumstances. This can be fleshed out in two ways: first
through discussion of Godwin’s conception of happiness and second through
a brief analysis of the second ‘passive’ right that he identifies, that of property
ownership.
VI
Hedonistic versions of utilitarianism invoke accounts of happiness that are
agent-relative: they value any activity that increases individual utility, a senti-
ment aptly captured by Bentham’s famed equation of the utilities of pushpin
and poetry.71 It is this relativity that leaves utilitarianism vulnerable to any num-
ber of counter-intuitive moral problems — one of which is its apparent inability
to guarantee any individual rights or freedoms if their existence happens to con-
flict with the demands of overall happiness. As R.M. Hare has shown, it is diffi-
cult to see how human slavery can be considered self-evidently unjust on
utilitarian criteria.72 As emphasized earlier, Godwin is infamously ruthless in
his application of utilitarian reasoning in Political Justice and rejects the idea
that individuals have significant rights; not even a right to life when duty calls
upon them to resign it.73 Given this attitude, Godwin could be expected to
offer a similarly strict utilitarian moral assessment of slavery. However, he
firmly rejects slavery as an ‘evil’. This sentiment does not at first seem partic-
ularly problematic, since any utilitarian political thinker can reject slavery on
the basis of an estimated calculation of overall happiness: slavery is thus
wrong not because it violates rights, but rather because slaves tend to live
unhappy lives.
This is clearly part of Godwin’s argument, which notes that slaves are
‘abridged’ of ‘independence and enjoyment’.74 However, although Godwin
does regard slavery as wrong for utilitarian reasons, this judgment does not
70 Ibid., pp. 258–9.
71 John Stuart Mill, ‘Bentham’, in Mill on Bentham and Coleridge, ed. F.R. Leavis
(London, 1950), p. 95.
72 R.M. Hare, ‘What is Wrong with Slavery?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8 (2)
(1979), pp. 103–21.
73 Godwin, Political Justice, I, p. 167.
74 Ibid., pp. 443–4.
Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2005
For personal use only -- not for reproduction
rely on a relativistic conception of human happiness. Thus, addressing con-
temporary parliamentary arguments in Britain, which defended slavery on the
grounds that the slaves themselves are quite content with their lot, Godwin
replies:
The true answer to this question, even granting them their fact, would be: ‘It
is not very material to a man of a liberal and enlarged mind whether they are
contented or no. Are they contented? I am not contented for them. I see in
them beings of certain capacities, equal to certain pursuits and enjoyments.
It is of no consequence in the question that they do not see this, that they do
not know their own interests and happiness. They do not repine? Neither
does a stone repine. That which you mention as an alleviation finishes in my
conception the portrait of their calamity . . . It is my duty, if I can, to make
them a thousand times happier than they are, or have any conception of
being’.75
Slavery is, then, unjust whether or not the slave in question regards herself as
happy. What this demonstrates is that, for Godwin, individual happiness is not
assessable in subjective terms as it would be for Bentham: individuals are not
always aware of what is good for them. But, more crucially, it shows that
although Godwin is adamant that ‘the true object of moral and political dis-
quisition is pleasure or happiness’76 he is not a hedonist.
Indeed, pleasure or happiness for Godwin is something assessable only in
qualitative terms. He elaborates on this, carefully distinguishing ‘primary’
pleasures of the external senses from more ‘exquisite’, ‘secondary’ pleasures.
Among these pleasures he includes ‘intellectual feeling’, ‘sympathy’ and
‘self-approbation’.77 Crucially, ‘the right cultivation of all our pleasures,
require individual independence’ and ‘without independence men cannot
become either wise, or useful, or happy’.78 The cultivation of pleasures
requires ‘soundness of understanding’, which in turn requires ‘freedom of
enquiry’.79 Furthermore, as noted earlier, if external forces ever threaten the
freedom of individuals, then virtuous action is prevented. This is because in
order for an individual action to generate utility and thus earn the appellation
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75 Ibid. Elsewhere in Political Justice, Godwin shows a similar attitude towards the
‘happy slave’: ‘To such men we ought to say, “You are satisfied with an oblivion of all
that is eminent in man; but we will awake you. You are contented with ignorance; but we
will enlighten you. You are not brutes: you are not stones. You sleep away existence in a
miserable neglect of your most valuable privileges: but you are capable of exquisite
delights; you are formed to glow with benevolence, to expatiate in the fields of knowl-
edge, to thrill with disinterested transport, to enlarge your thoughts, so as to take in the
wonders of the material universe, and the principles that bound and ascertain the general
happiness”.’ (ibid., p. 241).
76 Ibid., p. xxiii.
77 Ibid. See also pp. 240–1.
78 Ibid., p. xxiv.
79 Ibid., p. xxvii.
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‘virtuous’, it must not only cause an overbalance of pleasure; it also must
spring from an agent with a virtuous intention.80 The relation between free-
dom and happiness is clearly not a contingent one: the individual entitlement
to a sphere of discretion can never be traded for a gain in utility or discarded
when circumstances change.
This conclusion is borne out in the account Godwin provides of the second,
legitimate ‘passive’ right he identifies, that of property ownership, to which
he devotes the entire last ‘Book’ of Political Justice. His theory of property is
subtle, complex and difficult to summarize adequately. Nevertheless, its nor-
mative component is vital to an understanding of the importance of freedom
in his political theory. Godwin recognizes three different possible justifica-
tions of property ownership, which he refers to as ‘degrees’. The justification
that he appears to endorse is robustly utilitarian. It requires that
. . . my permanent right in those things the use of which being attributed to
me, a greater sum of benefit or pleasure will result than could have other-
wise appropriated. It is of no consequence, in this case, how I came into
possession of them, the only necessary conditions being their superior use-
fulness to me, and that my title to them is such as is generally acquiesced in
by the community in which I live. Every man is unjust who conducts him-
self in such a manner respecting these things as to infringe, in any degree,
upon my power of using them, at the time when the using them will be of
real importance to me.81
An agent has a right to a piece of property, then, provided her possession
results in a ‘greater sum of benefit or pleasure’ than otherwise. The corollary
of this is, of course, that property ownership, though an exclusive right, is
unlikely to be a very secure one. This is evident from Godwin’s earlier discus-
sion of the nature of rights, in which he makes clear that ‘every shilling’ we
possess is ‘appropriated by the laws of morality’: I have ‘no right to dispose of
[it] at my caprice’.82 Thus, whilst utility grounds our right to ownership, it also
places severe limitations on it. Indeed, as Alan Ryan points out, this argument
would seem to amount ‘to the denial of anything one could call property rights
at all’. ‘Anyone’, Ryan suggests ‘who thinks Godwinian utilitarianism a plau-
sible version of utilitarianism has to accept that utilitarianism is not in
80 The importance of individual intentions in determining the justness of an action is
a prominent, though little remarked upon, aspect of Godwin’s moral philosophy: ‘No
principle of moral science can be more obvious and fundamental than that the motive by
which we are induced to an action constitutes an essential part of its character. This idea
has perhaps sometimes been carried too far. A good motive is of little value when it is not
joined to a salutary exertion. But, without a good motive, the more extensively useful
action that ever was performed can contribute little to the improvement or honour of him
that performs it.’ (ibid., II, p. 332).
81 Ibid., p. 432. See also pp. 422–3.
82 Ibid., I, p. 169.
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principle favourable to property rights.’83 Individual ownership rights are
never absolute; they are merely rights of stewardship and they evaporate if
another agent can use the property in question in a way that generates more
happiness.
The defence that Godwin provides for this strict utilitarian basis for prop-
erty ownership is, however, not an unequivocal one. Indeed, there are addi-
tional stipulations in the passage cited above: he describes as ‘unjust’ any
conduct that seeks to remove my property when it is ‘of real importance to
me’, rather than of any more general utility. The implication is that as long as
what I have appropriated is of use to my own welfare, my right to it is pro-
tected regardless of wider utilitarian concerns. This claim is not a throwaway
comment, nor is it indicative of incoherence on Godwin’s part. The reason
that an agent may legitimately hold on to the property that they have appropri-
ated, regardless of the better use that another can make of it, comes down to
the importance of individual freedom.
After his delineation of the utilitarian justification of property ownership,
Godwin explains that
It has already appeared that one of the most essential of the rights of a man is
my right to the forbearance of others; not merely that they shall refrain from
every thing that may, by direct consequence, affect my life, or the posses-
sion of my powers, but that they shall refrain from usurping upon my under-
standing, and shall leave me a certain equal sphere for the exercise of my
private judgement . . . Hence it follows that no man may, in ordinary cases,
make use of my apartment, furniture or garments, or of my food, in the way
of barter or loan, without having first obtained my consent.84
He is quite clear then: no individual can (at least in ordinary cases) violate the
property right of another. Though the morally correct criteria for ownership is
utility, this utility cannot ordinarily trump the right of possession: as Godwin
puts it ‘he is only the steward. But still he is the steward’.85 When it comes to
property rights, the rule that individuals must have a right to freedom is of
more utility than that achievable through any ownership right.
Conclusion
Individual freedom — defined as a condition under which agents exist with-
out the encumbrance of others — clearly occupies a very special position
within Godwin’s utilitarian political theory. Nevertheless, the ultimately utili-
tarian basis of Godwin’s defence of individuality raises a rather awkward
question: namely, how much room is actually left for individual freedom
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83 Ryan, Property and Political Theory, p. 93.
84 Godwin, Political Justice, II, pp. 432–3.
85 Ibid., p. 434.
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within a political theory that includes a notion of human perfectibility?86 Is
Godwin’s claim that ‘each man must be taught to enquire and think for him-
self’87 something dangerously contradictory? Although individuals are guar-
anteed a certain sphere of liberty, which cannot be violated, is this only
freedom to conform to a predefined utilitarian morality? Godwin assumes that
individuals will improve through independence, but since he is so sure of what
improvement is, does this really represent an idea of freedom at all?
Such criticisms, though clearly pointed, are not necessarily fatal. After all,
at the normative level Godwin’s prescription is liberty, individuality and
independence. His hope is that by following his path the human species will
enter a stage of perpetual improvement. But, as he was aware, despite the
occasional rhetorical flourish, improvement is something that is not guaran-
teed. In other words, regardless of the outcome at the end of a process of indi-
viduals living in accordance with their private judgment, their right to do so
must at all times be preserved. Freedom of thought and discussion may be in
some sense a means to an expected end for Godwin, but his defence of
the means remains unequivocal regardless of whether the end is actually
achieved. In his critique of co-operative institutions and practices such as
marriage and cohabitation, he suggests that, in a more enlightened future age,
societies will reject ‘concerts of music’ and ‘theatrical exhibitions’;88 after all,
who in their right mind would want to blithely ‘repeat the words and ideas that
are not their own’?89 Yet this society of enlightened individuals who would
rather compose their own music than play that of another is what Godwin
believes is possible for the future: in the meantime, his moral theory defends
the right of every individual to decide what (or whether) they wish to perform.
Robert Lamb UNIVERSITY OF EXETER
86 Though Godwin does suggest that ‘man is perfectible’ (ibid, I, p. 92), he is careful
to insist that by this ‘it is not meant that he is capable of being brought to perfection’.
Rather, ‘the word seems sufficiently adapted to express the faculty of being continually
made better and receiving perpetual improvement . . . The term perfectible, thus
explained, not only does not imply the capacity of being brought to perfection, but stands
in express opposition to it. If we could arrive at perfection, there would be an end to our
improvement’ (ibid., p. 93).
87 Ibid., p. 288, emphasis added.
88 Ibid., II, p. 504.
89 Ibid.
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